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The Pitfalls and Politics of Holistic Justice 
Andrew Jillions & Rebekka Friedman 
Published in Global Policy, February 2015  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article critically assesses the concept of the complementarity of means, a concept which 
underpins the ‘holistic justice’ turn in post-conflict policymaking. Our concern is with how 
global transitional justice strategies are being informed by a compelling but vague ideal of 
institutional cooperation. Drawing on research into Sierra Leone’s ‘two tracks’ of transitional 
justice, we argue that political interaction between the two mechanisms and a contentious, ad 
hoc learning process between the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission were crucial to the way the complementarity of means has come 
to underpin the holistic justice agenda. We caution that by treating the complementarity of 
means as a mechanical outcome of the mere existence of separate transitional justice 
mechanisms, global policymakers have drawn the wrong empirical lessons from Sierra 
Leone. Political engagement played a central role in constructing a pragmatic partnership 
between the competing institutions, and in accounting for some of the long term and 
unintended consequences of transitional justice. We argue that if a complementarity of means 
is to be effectively realized global policymakers need to embrace – rather than deny – the 
politics of holistic justice.  
 
Policy Implications  
 Transitional justice mechanisms should recognize and address the tensions and 
competing policy choices represented by alternative mechanisms, inviting greater 
public debate about the appropriate configuration of the holistic justice agenda. 
 Key norm entrepreneurs, such as the UN and ICTJ, should do more to engage with the 
long term and unintended consequences of failed transitional justice. Assuming a 
complementarity of means has fostered misplaced complacency about the need to 
develop effective strategies for achieving holistic justice. 
 Understand that outreach to victims and affected communities plays a crucial role in 
communicating the terms of the relationship between different mechanisms of 
transitional justice, and, in turn, developing the social and political legitimacy of 
transitional justice mechanisms.   
 Accept that a complementarity of means does not emerge organically; effective 
cooperation requires greater strategic coordination both in the short and long term. To 
this end, stakeholders should draw up and work within a ‘transitional charter’, which 
sets out the basic terms of cooperation and provides a forum for resolving operational 
disputes.  
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The Complementarity of Means in Transitional Justice 
 
According to the UN and the International Center for Transitional Justice, a holistic approach 
to transitional justice is one with ‘several measures that complement one another’. Holistic 
justice holds that ‘no mechanism is likely to be effective in isolation’, encouraging a plurality 
of approaches which combine retributive and restorative conceptions of justice (International 
Center for Transitional Justice 2008, p. 2; see also, the UN 2008, pp. 3-4, UNSG 2011, pp. 4 
and 9). This emphasis on the complementarity of means has become prominent in empirical 
and normative transitional justice literature, which has increasingly argued that both 
retributive (criminal) and restorative (truth-seeking) measures serve different but equally 
valuable functions for transitional justice (Boraine 2006, De Greiff 2004, p. 17). Scholars 
have increasingly appealed to the holistic character of transitional justice to draw links to 
parallel practices and discourses of sustainable peace-building (see, for instance, Philpott 
2012; Sriram 2004 and 2013; and Mani 2007); the International Criminal Court (Boraine 
2006; Ðukić 2007; Clark 2011); and to define a framework for evaluating the impact and 
legacy of transitional justice programmes (Robins 2012, p. 2; Thoms et al 2010).  
 
How did we get to this point in which transitional justice supposedly encourages a 
complementarity of means, given that historically one of the core debates in transitional 
justice scholarship centred on the choice between clashing mechanisms of transitional 
justice? In South Africa, for example, the debate centred on the normative justifications for 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (hereon TRCs) versus trials (see, for example, 
Gutmann and Thompson, 2000; Minow, 2000). In many of these early contexts, the choice to 
establish a TRC was itself pragmatic – TRCs were set up as a ‘second best’ option where 
trials were forbidden in the terms of transition or where the new civilian regime feared 
conducting prosecutions would lead to political instability or a future coup (see, for example, 
Orentlicher, 1991). It may also be seen as one of the ‘paradoxes of fieldhood’ in which the 
success of transitional justice both in practice and as a policy language has led to a 
broadening out and reframing of the issues and agendas (Bell 2009; Balasco 2013). To some 
degree, the genesis of the holistic approach reflects the increasing acknowledgment of TRCs 
as important mechanisms of justice in their own right, rather than simply as second best 
alternatives to criminal justice (for example, Goldstone, 1996, Minow 2000, Kiss 2000, 
Rotberg 2000).  
 
As the field has become increasingly institutionalized as part of a global policy agenda – 
through NGO advocacy, notably the International Center for Transitional Justice, and the 
incorporation of transitional justice into a ‘mainstream’ UN agenda – it has also gone through 
a period of conceptual stock-taking, where the perceived tensions between retributive and 
restorative justice were confronted and, for many, resolved (McAvoy 2007; Subotić 2012; on 
tensions between peace versus justice, see Kerr and Mobekk 2007; Sriram 2004). In this 
process, conceptions of justice were stretched out and redefined to encapsulate the other, to 
the extent that scholars and practitioners were able to conceptualize ‘transitional justice’ as 
necessarily encompassing both retributive and restorative dimensions (De Grieff 2012, pp. 
3 
 
17-18; Teitel 2003, pp. 83-84). This idea of a natural connection between the component 
parts of transitional justice was solidified by the empirically demonstrable desire among 
individuals and affected communities for both criminal accountability and truth-seeking and 
reconciliation (Lambourne 2009, 37-45).  
 
The result is the current widely held and firmly institutionalized belief that a 
‘complementarity of means’ is naturally embedded in the various mechanisms, mindsets, and 
values adopted by those in charge of delivering holistic justice. (1) This belief also 
establishes a conceptual framework for managing the operational difficulties that accompany 
the ever-expanding mandate of transitional justice (Mani 2008; Bell 2009; Balasco 2013). 
Because it knits together a claim about the legitimacy, process and outcome of transitional 
justice, justice is constructed in functionalist terms, based on the ability of institutions to meet 
certain procedural criteria and contribute to certain widely valued outcomes. This functional 
legitimacy of holistic justice is tied to the existence of multiple, overlapping initiatives – 
including criminal prosecutions, truth-telling, reparations programmes, building rule of law, 
and institutional reform – able to meet the needs of a diverse set of local, national and 
international stakeholders. Bundled together, these mechanisms establish a process, which 
avoids the architects of a transitional justice strategy having to choose between the 
underlying values of, for example, truth and criminal accountability, and which, by the same 
token, prevents the differences between various stakeholders regarding the hierarchy of these 
values and mechanisms from derailing the process. Finally, that these mechanisms can be 
shown to have successfully worked together is a structural outcome around which a society 
emerging from conflict can build a just peace. 
 
This promises a lot for the holistic justice agenda, both at the point of implementation and in 
post-hoc evaluation of the legacy or success of a transitional justice strategy. But does the 
concept of holistic justice really obviate the need to worry about the politics of transitional 
justice? Does it dismantle the binaries of peace versus justice; retributive versus restorative 
justice; truth versus accountability; and international versus local demands for justice? The 
influential approaches of the United Nations and the International Center for Transitional 
Justice suggests that the answer is an unambiguous ‘yes’. The UN’s position is that effective 
transitional justice programmes use ‘the full range of judicial and non-judicial processes and 
measures’ and foster an environment in which ‘various transitional justice mechanisms can 
positively complement each other in post-conflict and transitional environments’ (Guidance 
Note of the Secretary General, 2010, p. 6). The compelling picture that emerges in the 
approach adopted by the ‘gatekeepers’ of transitional justice (Subotić 2012, p. 108) is of a 
policy realm capable of mechanically delivering both the broad aims of justice and peace in 
the affected society, as well as coherence and coordination amongst the various policy actors 
involved in the broader tasks of rule of law and peace-building.  
 
The purpose of this article is to critically evaluate these claims, focusing on the operational 
pitfalls surrounding the holistic justice agenda. This article builds on an analysis of how the 
complementarity of means functioned in Sierra Leone to illustrate how and why the holistic 
justice agenda being applied by global policymakers and institutions fails to engage the 
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‘transformative’ dimension of holistic justice, where success (and the evaluation of success) 
is linked to the broader possibility of social and political transformation (see especially 
Leebaw, 2008, p. 96-98; Lambourne 2009, p. 34, Lambourne 2010). (2) Insufficient 
engagement of the institutional politics required to deliver holistic justice skews the 
evaluation of transitional justice towards a technocratic, box-ticking exercise centered on the 
existence of an appropriate range of institutions rather than the broader conditions and 
concerns which define the potential of these institutions to deliver a holistic agenda. We 
argue that if holistic justice is to be more than a compelling but vague option for global 
policymakers to link the fragmented discourses and institutions engaged in post-conflict 
justice and peace-building, the architects of the holistic approach need to adopt a more 
explicitly political approach to the complementarity of means than traditionally envisioned. 
The next section turns to the case study of Sierra Leone, which functions both as a 
microcosm of the operational issues surrounding the concept of holistic justice and as the 
case which has, more than any other, helped define the current holistic justice agenda. 
 
Resurrecting the Politics of Complementarity  
 
The eleven-year civil war in Sierra Leone killed over 50,000 people and displaced over 
500,000 (Gberie 2005, 6). While the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) became well known 
for specific and personalized violence – amputations and its targeting of village elders and 
chiefs – all sides committed abuses of civilians, including sexual violence and slavery, 
looting and raiding of villages, and the recruitment and forced abduction of child soldiers. An 
estimated 5000-7000 children fought in the war, often recruited among vulnerable refugee 
populations displaced by the fighting (Zack-Williams 2001, 73). While some joined 
voluntarily, many were abducted, with ex-RUF child soldiers commonly reporting 
experiences of fighting on the frontlines after being drugged with mixtures of gunpowder and 
cocaine. Children were often ordered to commit brutalities as part of their initiation, 
sometimes against family members, arguably making them fear future retaliation from 
civilians and ensuring their loyalty to the armed forces (Zack-Williams 2001, 80). Tens of 
thousands of civilians had limbs amputated, devastating livelihoods in a primarily rural 
economy.  
 
The Sierra Leonean TRC was set up as part of the Lomé Peace Accord, signed on 7 July 
1999, which called for a TRC in exchange for a general amnesty promised during the 
ceasefire. The TRC appointed four national and three international commissioners, including 
four men and three women, and employed a mixture of domestic and international staff to 
conduct research and take statements. Because of the scale and inhumanity of the conflict, the 
international community took a particularly keen interest (Hayner 2004, p. 3). Funding for the 
TRC came mainly from international sources through the United Nations Development 
Programme, including the US, UK, EU, Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Hayner 
2004, 3). During the TRC’s statement-taking period from 4 December 2002 to 31 March 
2003, the commission collected 7,706 statements from around the country (TRC, Witness to 
Truth, Volume 1, Chapter 5). The TRC presented its final report to the President of Sierra 
Leone on 5 October 2004 and to the United Nations Security Council on 27 October 2004.  
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Although the Lomé Accord had promised a general amnesty to the RUF, on 12 July 2000, 
then Sierra Leonean President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah wrote to the UN Security Council, 
requesting an ad hoc criminal tribunal to be set up in Sierra Leone. The Security Council 
passed Resolution 1315, stipulating that the Secretary General should negotiate an agreement 
with the Kabbah administration for an ‘independent special court’. The UN established the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in January of 2002 after the Kabbah government and 
the Security Council agreed to the Secretary General’s proposal. The court itself was a hybrid 
tribunal, employing a mixture of international and domestic staff and was intentionally 
established at the site of the conflict in Sierra Leone in Sierra Leone’s capital, Freetown. (3) 
The SCSL has detained eleven individuals in total, two of whom have died. Eight have been 
sentenced and are serving their terms. On 30 May 2012, former Liberian President, Charles 
Taylor, was sentenced at the Hague, marking the first successful prosecution of an African 
head of state. 
 
Separation as Strategy 
 
Early on, external and domestic observers expressed concern about the relationship between 
the SCSL and the TRC, and the impact each would have on the other. On the one hand, 
proponents of restorative justice feared that trials would pose a threat to peace and clash with 
traditional Sierra Leonean conflict resolution mechanisms (Witness to Truth, 2004, Volume 
2, Chapter 1). The most straightforward challenge was how the Special Court would function 
in the face of the amnesty agreement set out by the Lomé Peace Accord. (4) The SCSL’s 
establishment prompted fears that the Special Court could subpoena the TRC and override its 
guarantees of confidentiality. On the other hand, proponents of criminal prosecution and 
members of the Special Court criticized the TRC as offering an inadequate approach, 
inconsistent with international legal norms and obligations (Schabas, 2004, p. 1083). 
 
The abiding perception in this scholarship is that despite operational tensions between the 
two institutions, particularly over the SCSL’s decision not to allow the indicted to testify at 
the TRC, this was, by and large, a successful implementation of transitional justice (Schabas 
2003, 2004, 2012; Horovitz 2006; Jalloh 2013). For this literature, significantly, it was the 
formal institutional separation, which allowed each body to serve complementary functions. 
This included the establishment of an objective historical record of the causes and actors 
responsible for the conflict and a more comprehensive recognition, redress and sense of 
justice and accountability for the victims (Schabas 2003, p. 1065). In what has become the 
central tenet of the holistic approach, Schabas argues that these complementary functions 
were best realized as each mechanism developed its own distinctive orientation. For example, 
while both bodies were nominally engaged in outreach, the TRC promoted catharsis and 
social empowerment and engaged victims and affected communities, whereas the Court’s 
outreach was instrumentally focused on its evidentiary requirements. While the SCSL 
focused on ‘those who bear the greatest responsibility’ for crimes committed within Sierra 
Leone, the TRC, in contrast, investigated abuses committed by individuals, groups, societies 
or states, abroad or within Sierra Leone. Although this was not explicit in its mandate, many 
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argue that the TRC, in contrast, put particular emphasis on sexual violence and youth, with 
the UN and SCSL officials repeatedly expressed the view the TRC was a better platform for 
dealing with child offenders, and Chief Prosecutor David Crane arguing that he was not 
interested in child soldiers (Crane 2008, p 15). (5)  
 
Importantly, in Schabas’ view, the TRC and SCSL worked best when kept separate because 
trying to integrate mechanisms with distinctive, competing restorative and retributive 
mandates in any more substantive way was, first, unlikely to succeed and, second, was 
unnecessary for the transitional justice project (2003, pp. 1063-1066). (6) This second claim 
was the result of thinking that the complementarity of means was a direct consequence of the 
common commitment among the stakeholders to building a stable and lasting peace. 
Explaining this link between a common commitment and the complementarity of means as 
parallel tracks to a common end, Schabas draws an analogy with building a house: 
 
Although there is much common ground, this does not mean that the two institutions 
necessarily have much to share in terms of their methodologies and their resources. 
Perhaps the appropriate metaphor is that of building a house. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission is the plumber, and the Special Court is the electrician. 
The two trades work in different parts of the house, on different days, at different 
stages of the construction, and using different tools and materials. Nobody would 
want to live in a finished house that lacked either electricity or plumbing. The best 
way to ensure that both succeed and that the house gets completed on schedule is that 
they be left alone (2003, p. 1065, our italics). 
 
The implication, in other words, is that transitional justice worked to deliver a positive legacy 
because different mechanisms were focused on their own mandates and operated along 
different ‘tracks’. A complementarity of means – on this account – does not emerge through 
active interaction or planning but rather as an inbuilt and organic consequence of the 
existence of different ‘tracks’ or transitional justice processes involved. Schabas’ account 
helps establish why holistic justice strategies have tended to take for granted the 
complementarity of means. If complementarity emerges as a function of the separation of 
different mechanisms, rather than as a result of active policy integration, there is no great 
onus on different global and local peace-building initiatives to actively pursue constructive 
forms of collaboration.  
 
Constructing a Common Political Domain 
 
The idea that a complementarity of means emerged organically in the Sierra Leonean context 
is somewhat odd, given the admission by those involved that there were a series of attempts 
to pre-empt problems and harmonize the relationship between the Special Court and the TRC 
during the initial stages of the post-conflict process. As part of establishing this informal 
“transitional charter”, international and domestic NGOs and civil society officials held a 
number of meetings, including with the International Center for Transitional Justice. Priscilla 
Hayner and Paul van Zyl, together with the US Institute of Peace and International Human 
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Rights Law Group, held an expert round table on how the Special Court and TRC would 
interact (Schabas 2003, p. 1048; Schabas 2012). The October 2000 UNSG report stated that: 
‘Relationship and cooperation agreements would be required between the Special Court and 
the national TRC, including the use of the commission as an alternative to prosecution and 
the prosecution of juveniles in particular’ (Report of the Secretary General, 2000, p. 28 in 
Schabas 2003, p. 1048). The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 
United Nations Mission for Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) subsequently held a workshop which 
proposed a consultative process to ‘work out the relationship’ between the two bodies to 
institutionalize a set of guidelines detailing their respective roles (Eleventh Report of the 
Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, in Schabas 2003, p. 1048). 
 
What’s more, although both bodies put special emphasis on public outreach as an important 
element of legitimizing their activities and consolidating a sphere of influence, the strategic 
decision to “do outreach” was not defined by the awareness of being part of a common 
political project. Instead, the particular outreach strategies adopted were a result of each body 
being forced to publically justify its existence and contribution vis-à-vis the other. These 
outreach activities were also part of confronting problems created as a result of the competing 
approaches adopted by the two bodies. For the TRC, in particular, generating participation 
through outreach required confronting the popular fear that testimony would lead to 
incrimination and prosecution by the SCSL. Popular confusion among Sierra Leoneans as to 
the differences between both bodies and legal spheres and demarcations of each magnified 
these fears (Friedman, forthcoming, Kelsall 2005, Shaw 2010). The TRC sought to tackle this 
challenge by taking a strong stance against individual guilt and in favour of confidentiality. 
While the TRC used public hearings, similar to the South African TRC, much of its work 
took place in confidence, behind closed doors. Particular groups, such as victims of sexual 
violence, testified in confidence unless they expressed the desire to speak publicly; children 
always spoke anonymously and confidentially and usually had a family member or where this 
was not possible, an adult mentor with them (Michael Charley, interview, 24 July 2009). The 
point here is that the fear among ex-combatants that testifying at the TRC would lead to 
prosecutions at the Special Court led the TRC to take a stronger stance on confidentiality as a 
mechanism of reassurance than they otherwise might have done.
 
(7) 
 
The reliance of both bodies on ex-combatant participation did not lead to an easy or 
cooperative relationship, but it did lead both bodies to emphasise to the public as part of their 
outreach efforts that the Special Court was only focusing on the big fish, those who ‘bore the 
greatest responsibility’. The TRC, in contrast, adopted a non-incrimination policy by 
emphasizing the importance of learning and moving forward over individualizing guilt – a 
discourse which directly targeted the criminal justice mandate of the SCSL. As TRC 
President, Bishop Joseph Humper justifies it in retrospect, the TRC was not established to 
blame or ‘scapegoat’. In his view, everyone was both a victim and guilty in one form or 
another in the Sierra Leonean civil war (Humper, interview, 28 July 2009). Although the 
TRC was established as a restorative body from the start, he also concedes that the 
commission de-emphasized individual guilt over time as a strategy to solicit popular 
participation in light of the court’s punitive approach (see also Witness to Truth, Volume 2).  
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Indirect Effects and Unintended Consequences 
 
The political interaction – or integration as part of a common political domain – between the 
TRC and the SCSL had a relatively direct impact on both the outreach strategies adopted and 
on the treatment of ex-combatants, undermining the idea that institutional separation was the 
key to their success. But there were also important indirect effects of the institutional divide 
for the degree to which victims and affected communities view the legacy of both institutions 
both in their own lives and in Sierra Leone.  
 
While it can be argued that the TRC successfully aired the depravity of crimes committed, it 
also made it possible for many perpetrators to escape having to confront their guilt for the 
physical act in any meaningful way. As detailed by anthropologist Rosalind Shaw, the post-
TRC period witnessed a certain narrative and discourse of agency during the war, in which 
ex-combatants who wanted to establish themselves into civilian life needed to identify as 
victims (Shaw 2010, pp. 124-125). Truth telling in these circumstances became, to a degree, a 
process of reconstructing innocence and victimization, in the catalogue of counterfactual 
assertions that ‘I couldn’t have done these things if I’d been sober, if I’d been sane’, or ‘I did 
these things but others did much worse’. If a strong point of TRCs (and indeed the stated 
intention of this TRC in its mandate) is the capacity to paint a more accurate picture of the 
social processes underlying conflicts, the extent to which participants did acknowledge 
personal responsibility becomes an important issue in critical empirical evaluations of the 
TRC. According to Tim Kelsall, who sat in on a week of TRC hearings in Tonkolil, Northern 
Sierra Leone, perpetrators in the hearings he attended apologized to the community for 
wrongs committed, but none admitted individual responsibility, and only one seemed 
‘genuinely contrite’ (2005, p. 372). Kelsall criticizes the hearings as generally focused on 
perpetrators and their reintegration into their communities, pointing out that victims were 
frequently missing from the hearings (2005, p. 389). Testimonies of perpetrators in Sierra 
Leone often focused on explanation of their actions, rather than admission of guilt and 
contrition. In a study, conducted by the Sierra Leone NGO Pride with support from the 
International Center for Transitional Justice, ex-combatants stated the following reasons for 
their participation in the TRC: ‘I hope to be free from people when I say the truth’, ‘The TRC 
will give us a chance to explain why we fought’, ‘the truth will help families and victims 
forgive us’, and ‘it will let our families accept us in good faith’. According to the report, 
seventy-two percent of ex-RUF maintained they had been forcibly recruited and many claim 
to have been drugged and forced to commit acts of violence against people they knew (Pride 
in collaboration with the International Center for Transitional Justice, 2002, pp. 8-12). 
 
At one level, the parallel existence of the SCSL provided an avenue for addressing the 
perception that perpetrators were escaping having to confront their personal responsibility. Its 
presence meant that the TRC could accept these excuses, in the knowledge that a number of 
high-level perpetrators would be subject to a serious interrogation of individual 
responsibility. The emphasis on collective responsibility at the TRC is to some extent a 
pragmatic response to a war-weary society where many ex-combatants began fighting as 
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youth and an emphasis among sizable portions of civil society on the importance of 
development and moving forward over punitive justice. What is more worrying, however, is 
that victims in the two-track model fell between the gaps created by a lack of integration. 
Given the emphasis by both the Court and the TRC that the Court was the primary body for 
establishing criminal accountability, as the TRC’s work advanced, disappointment was 
particularly acute among victims, who looked to the commission for assistance in pursuing 
other forms of justice, notably compensation, and representing their needs. This is 
particularly tragic in the case of amputees, many of whom live isolated in disability camps 
and are still waiting for reparations (on victims’ perceptions of the TRC in Sierra Leone and 
the lack of reparatory justice, see Millar 2011, pp. 524-529). In a context of severe socio-
economic underdevelopment and poverty, victims frequently contrasted the UN 
Demobilization and Reintegration processes, which paid each combatant $ 150 USD to give 
up their weapons, to the lack of reparations for victims (Friedman forthcoming; Lambourne 
2009, p. 43). (8) As put by Alhaji Jusu Jaka, Chair of the Sierra Leone Amputees and War 
Wounded Association: ‘They spent millions to reintegrate the ex-combatants in the DDR 
process. If they could just spend a small fraction of this on the victims, it would make such a 
difference. It is not fair. We have a permanent disability; it is for life. Our children are our 
breadwinners. We are like children. Looking at me, people say, “that man is finished.” 
Sometimes it is hard to get food here.’ (Jaka, personal interview, 7 August 2009; similar 
findings emerged strongly in the authors’ research in Grafton War Wounded and Disability 
Camp, July and August 2009). These grievances affect the long-term legacy and impact of 
transitional justice because they have the potential to stunt the physical and mental well-being 
of victims and affected communities (Pham et al, p. 105).  
 
Were the gains of transitional justice really a result of the hard separation between different 
mechanisms of transitional justice? To the extent that Sierra Leone does represent a 
functioning example of holistic justice and the complementarity of means, there is convincing 
evidence to suggest that this emerged as a result of the hard fought institutional politics of 
transitional justice, rather than as a result of an apolitical, technocratic institutional 
separation. That Sierra Leone’s two tracks of transitional justice were able, eventually, to 
complement each other on clearly defined issues was a product of the ongoing – if vague, 
informal, and often fractious – political interaction between transitional justice practitioners. 
This is particularly clear in the management of tensions over outreach and confidentiality. 
Moreover, there was an indirect process of integration as each body was compelled to justify 
and explain its specific contribution to peace-building in Sierra Leone during the outreach 
process.  
 
As far as the holistic approach to transitional justice is concerned, Sierra Leone highlights the 
importance of integration – messy, politicized, and ad hoc as it may have been. These are not 
issues that could have been resolved through strengthening the separation between the 
various transitional justice mechanisms. Instead, they highlight some of the problems which 
take root when a complementarity of means is assumed rather than actively pursued, and the 
need to have a fully integrated transitional justice strategy from the beginning, where the 
impact of various initiatives – whether aimed at restorative, retributive or, indeed, reparative 
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justice – can all be considered, weighed up, and fought over. Only then can the positive 
benefits of a complementarity of means be effectively implemented.  
 
Recalibrating the Holistic Justice agenda  
 
What, then, can this revised history of how the complementarity of means functioned in 
Sierra Leone tell us about the holistic justice agenda in global policymaking? Its proponents 
argue that the TRC and the SCSL were able to deliver on their individual mandates in a way 
that contributed overall to the broader project of transitional justice. Restorative and 
retributive mechanisms had different roles to play, and by and large, they found a way to 
pursue their work without interfering in the other’s mandate.  
 
What our analysis suggests, however, is that institutional progress and social impact here was 
a result of key actors learning over time how to better integrate competing restorative and 
retributive aims and mechanisms, particularly as problems arose during their outreach 
activities. (9) It was in those moments when transitional justice actors confronted the tensions 
between competing mechanisms and strategic mindsets openly and honestly that they began 
to learn how to manage these tensions and trade-offs and present a ‘holistic’ front to domestic 
and international stakeholders. Establishing a transitional charter, which aimed at a ‘genuine 
partnership rather than lip service’, was one aspect of this which has not been widely 
replicated by global policymakers, perhaps on the assumption that this was incidental to the 
holistic outcome of the Sierra Leone process. At the same time, the failures – and missed 
opportunities – in Sierra Leone can be attributed to the lack of depth or structure in 
integrating the two main bodies, and a reliance on this ad hoc process to deliver consistent 
results. The complementary relationship between the TRC and the SCSL became toxic in 
those moments when each body failed to confront their separate but overlapping jurisdictions, 
such as on the issues of fair trial standards and confidentiality.  
 
Global policymakers have not often been forced to rue missed opportunities or failures in 
their transitional justice programming. Thoms, for example, notes a ‘prevailing ambiguity 
surrounding transitional justice impacts’ (Thoms, Ron, and Paris 2010, p. 332; see also 
Robins 2012, p. 3; and Pham, Vinck and Weinstein 2010, p. 100). The danger of this 
ambiguity, and of the parallel perception that impact evaluation may not be suitable for this 
field, is deepened by the continued complacency surrounding the complementarity of means. 
For example, a 2013 UN Secretary-General Report on measuring the effectiveness of rule of 
law programmes (including transitional justice) argues that ‘a focus on measuring the impact 
of the support provided by the United Nations system for the rule of law must not mean 
losing sight of the observation on the interrelationship between the rule of law and the three 
pillars of the United Nations (peace and security, development, and human rights)  . . . The 
approach to measurement adopted by the United Nations must reflect this holistic approach’. 
And yet, as we have sought to illustrate, taking the complementarity of means for granted 
seems to leave the possible negative consequences of adopting a holistic approach immune 
from criticism or evaluation.  
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These questions are slowly being asked in the context of established or ‘mature’ holistic 
transitional justice programmes where the reliance on institutional separation has allowed 
social and political divisions to fester (see Richmond 2009, Mac Ginty 2010 and 2010, 
Autsesserre 2014, and Millar 2014). Drawing on Anna L. Tsing (2005), Rosalind Shaw and 
Gearoid Millar use the concept of ‘frictions’ to describe interactions in the perception of local 
populations between the various ‘universals’ represented in multiple parallel transitional 
justice and peace-building projects which are transferred to local contexts (Shaw 2007, p. 
186; Millar 2014, p. 141; and Millar 2011, p. 517). At the intersection of critical peace-
building and transitional justice, scholars have questioned the emphasis on finite formal 
objectives, such as truth-seeking and prosecutions, over longer-term social economic justice 
and psychosocial needs and community healing. Roger Mac Ginty (2010) calls for a victim-
centered and grassroots sustainable approach to transitional justice, rooted in an ‘everyday’ 
praxis of care and empathetic relations. In this scholarship, internationalized transitional 
justice is often faulted for its insufficient engagement with the needs and priorities of local 
stakeholders, and lack of ownership, as in Sierra Leone, where communities frequently 
lumped together parallel international transitional justice and humanitarian post-conflict 
recovery efforts, including the SCSL, the TRC, and the Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration programmes (Shaw 2010, p. 121). 
 
Similar findings have emerged in other contexts. As a recent Amnesty International (2013) 
report puts it, the ‘patchwork and piecemeal’ nature of the transitional justice architecture in 
Northern Ireland has also helped to undermine the confidence and trust of victims and 
affected communities in the ability of these institutions to deliver truth, justice and 
reconciliation. Social transformation is unlikely to emerge through a technocratic, closed 
conversation. Instead, the ability of the various institutional tracks to work together 
productively depends, at least in part, on being able to communicate to victims and affected 
communities how different mechanisms are mutually reinforcing. But the effect of assuming 
a complementarity of means has instead led global policymakers to be satisfied with asserting 
that different mechanisms of transitional justice are mutually reinforcing processes as a way 
to avoid triggering legitimate and important political debates over the compromises made in 
order to achieve peace without the rigorous critical interrogation of their compatibility and 
functions.    
 
Conclusions 
 
Not all global policy actors are blind to the dilemmas involved with realising holistic justice 
(see, for example, UNDP 2012), but the dominant technocratic narrative encourages an 
assumption that conceptual differences can all be resolved ‘downstream’, at the point of 
implementation, without acknowledging the need to cede anything of importance. We have 
used the Sierra Leone experience to argue that the assumption of a complementarity of means 
is a barrier to realising the transformational potential benefits of a holistic justice agenda, 
particularly when it comes to doing outreach. We suggest that hiding away the messy, 
contentious politics of holistic justice puts the house that transitional justice built on shaky 
foundations.  
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It is, perhaps, unsurprising that policymakers remain wary about inviting open political 
debate about the appropriate transitional justice strategy in societies emerging from periods of 
protracted conflict for fear of exacerbating underlying political divisions over the relative 
weight to give to truth, criminal justice and reconciliation. But operating under the pretence 
that a coherent transitional justice agenda can emerge because of a natural complementarity 
of means is both empirically false and strategically short-sighted. We have argued that 
realising the complementarity of means demands that policymakers work to foster an honest 
engagement with the trade-offs and tensions which structure the politics of holistic justice. 
This, in our view, requires treating holistic justice as a valuable political end, rather than as a 
generic portmanteau concept capable of automatically generating policy coherence. One 
practical way to realise this is to establish an oversight mechanism, such as a transitional 
charter, which has the capacity to orchestrate and manage the tensions between the various 
transitional justice mechanisms. Also important is a transparent and participatory consultation 
process that engages key stakeholders.  
 
Transitional justice processes are by nature set up in contentious and challenging contexts. In 
sites of deep polarization, with little trust and severely damaged infrastructure, agents 
establishing and implementing transitional justice are unlikely to find agreement or be able to 
satisfy all affected parties. However, holistic justice will only emerge if the architects of any 
transitional justice strategy are consciously engaged with the trade-offs and disagreements 
involved in choosing between different pathways. Transitional justice will always be an 
imperfect, messy process involving hard decisions about which goals and whose priorities to 
focus on. This makes understanding and engaging with the pitfalls and politics of holistic 
justice crucial, because it is in the political wrangling over how best to implement a holistic 
justice agenda that the different tracks of transitional justice are able to solidify their claim to 
social and institutional legitimacy. If the lofty rhetoric of holistic justice is to be realised in 
practice, understanding and embracing the politics involved must be the first step.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1) We distinguish the holistic approach as understood by the global transitional justice 
policy bodies and practitioners, notably the UN and the International Center for 
Transitional Justice, from holistic justice as advocated by scholars working at the 
intersection of transitional justice and peace-building, notably Wendy Lambourne and 
Rama Mani. 
2) Although mainly thematic and reflective, the article also draws on four months of 
field research carried out between 2009-2010 on transitional justice and post-conflict 
peace-building and reconciliation in rural and urban areas in Sierra Leone. The 
research involved a total of 45 semi-structured interviews and an additional 8 focus 
groups with officials and civil society involved in Sierra Leone’s transitional justice 
process, as well as direct stakeholders, including victims, ex-combatants, and 
inhabitants, teachers, academics and community leaders. The research was divided 
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between Freetown and war-affected areas, notably Kailahun district and Grafton. The 
objective of the research was to gain understanding of the objectives and methods of 
transitional justice from officials directly involved in transitional justice, and an in 
depth understanding of how stakeholders (victims, ex-combatants, and war-affected 
communities) saw and evaluated international and local transitional justice and peace-
building. The field research focused on local perceptions of the SCSL, the TRC, and 
the community reconciliation project, Fambul Tok. 
3) In contrast to the earlier ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia, which 
were established off site in Arusha, Tanzania, and the Hague, respectively. One 
exception is the high profile trial of Liberian President, Charles Taylor. Taylor was 
tried in the Hague due to concern that the trial would cause instability although 
Special Court legal officials are still responsible for running the trial. 
4) Article 9 of the Lomé Peace Accord granted ‘absolute and free pardon’ to General 
Foday Sankoh, as well as ‘absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and 
collaborators in respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives up to 
the time of the signing of the present agreement’ (Conciliation Resources, 2000). The 
Lomé Accord also promised that the ‘Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every 
facility to the RUF to transform itself into a political party and enter the mainstream 
of the democratic process’, stating that within thirty days of the agreement, ‘the 
necessary legal steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone to enable the 
RUF to register as a political party’ (Conciliation Resources, 2000). 
5) While the minimum age of offenders at the SCSL was fifteen years (as opposed to 
ICC’s minimum age of eighteen years), UN and SCSL officials repeatedly publicly 
expressed the view that prosecuting child offenders was not in the Special Court’s 
jurisdiction and that the TRC was better served to deal with youth perpetrators. See, 
for example, SCSL, Prosecutor, David Crane’s interview with the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, IRIN (25 September 2012), available at: 
http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=31&ReportId=70568.   
6) Although during their operation, he initially called for cooperation between the 
Special Court and the TRC, especially in terms of information sharing, in retrospect, 
Schabas attributes the success of the two mechanisms to their demarcation of roles 
and their willingness to not interfere with each other’s work. Fear that testimony will 
lead to self-incrimination and can be used as evidence at the SCSL continues to this 
day. The Sierra Leonean community reconciliation project, Fambul Tok, sill 
encounters the fear of prosecution as a barrier to generating ex-combatant 
participation at community reconciliation ceremonies. 
7) Fear that testimony will lead to self-incrimination and can be used as evidence at the 
SCSL continues to this day. The Sierra Leonean community reconciliation project, 
Fambul Tok, sill encounters the fear of prosecution as a barrier to generating ex-
combatant participation at community reconciliation ceremonies. 
8) Donors spent a total of US $ 80 million for Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) in Sierra Leone. Ex-combatants received the equivalent of $150 
USD for handing in a weapon. However DDR statistics show that while around 
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72,490 combatants were disarmed fewer than half that number of weapons was 
collected. For more information, see Sesay and Suma (2009). 
9) Although a common criticism of the Sierra Leonean TRC is that its proceedings were 
too rushed and that it did not deeply engage with individuals in the countryside. For 
an expanded discussion on this topic, see the Sierra Leone Working Group on Truth 
and Reconciliation. ‘Searching for Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone: An Initial Study 
of the Performance and Impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’. 
February 2006. Available at: www.fambultok.org/TRCStudy-FinalVersion.pdf. 
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